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ABSTRACT
The expansion of participation processes and techniques around
the world in recent years takes place under the rhetoric of citizen
empowerment. This rhetoric has been questioned by many
scholars, who often point out the weak impact of such practices
and the new games of domination to which participation is
submitted. This article examines this dilemma from the expansion
of participatory budgeting in the global North. We propose a
study of assembly processes involving the local public
administration in the cities of Chicago and Córdoba. This process
reveals conflicts and paradoxes that often remain hidden in the
research, but nevertheless show struggles to appropriate and







There is no doubt that today we are living through a veritable ‘participatory revolution’.
From citizen juries to plebisicites, e-forums of various sorts, and participatory budgeting
processes, across the global North and global South over the last two decades citizen par-
ticipation in government has become ubiquitous. Today, as Lee, Mcquarrie, and Walker
(2015, p. 7) note, ‘across the political spectrum, increasing citizen voice is viewed as a
necessary counterweight to elite power and bureaucratic rationality’. More sanguine advo-
cates, like Leighninger (2006, p. 2), argue that ‘(i)n the 20th century, public life revolved
around government; in the 21st century, it will center on citizens’.
Whether or not citizen participation is actually successful, a remarkable consensus has
emerged around its desirability. Participation, as a way to give voice to citizens in public
affairs, has become an imperative of our time and the subject of countless international
conferences, government projects, and policy reforms, and is at the centre of much
recent contemporary political thinking (Blondiaux & Sintomer, 2002; Peck & Theodore,
2010). From the World Bank and Occupy-type movements in the global North to political
parties and non-governmental organizations worldwide, political participation today
occupies an exceptional position as a privileged prescription for solving difficult problems
and remedying the inherent flaws of democracy (Ancelovici, Dafour, & Nez, 2016;
Newton, 2012; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2000).
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This rise of enthusiasm for participatory democracy has also inspired scepticism. Criti-
cal voices protest that while participatory democracy’s scope has expanded, its emancipa-
tory dimension has all but disappeared from policy discourse on the subject. If in the
1960s, participation was understood as prefigurative of a new, ‘radically democratic
society’ (Poletta, 2005, p. 275), this is no longer the case. If once activists expected partici-
pation to bring about emancipation for citizens in a world otherwise dominated by politi-
cal and economic elites, today participation is understood as complementary to the social
order. Participation in this age is no longer a counter-power; it has become part of the
planning of how power functions.
Our purpose in this article is to analyse the conflicts and paradoxes generated by the
implementation of participatory processes from above. Is it still possible to talk about
emancipation in this context? While participation is often associated with an emancipa-
tory rhetoric by its promoters, who frequently argue that participation will bring social
justice, equality and better policies (Ganuza, Nez, & Morales, 2014), its implementation
is more ambiguous. Generally speaking, participatory reforms have little impact on
public policies, do little to increase social justice, sometimes increase existing inequalities
among participants, if not outright used to justify neoliberal politics (Lee et al., 2015; Pol-
letta, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2005). Yet, the implementation of participatory processes can be
conflictive, because they expose the gap between an idealized image of participation linked
to empowerment and a public administration that is usually wary of opening the decision-
making process. The outcome of this struggle is generally taken as a symptom of a decline
of participatory processes, and their ability (or not) to empower citizens. But while the
results may be disappointing, as many scholars have shown in their case studies
(Ganuza & Frances, 2012; Sintomer, Herzberg, & Röcke, 2008; Talpin, 2012), we think
that the difficulties and conflicts generated in participatory processes reveal a ceaseless
struggle to expand democratic borders (Smith, 2009). We agree that this struggle may
not always represent a transformational policy, but we suggest that it can nonetheless
mark a step forward in democratic thinking and equality between the members of a pol-
itical community.
The article has several sections. We first present a theoretical framework as a point from
which to start thinking about participation and subsequently analyse participatory
phenomena. Faced with the idea of highlighting the quality of participatory processes to
discuss the impact and place of participation in contemporary societies, we understand
participation as a process of struggle in which it is inevitable to perceive it as part of
the power games surrounding the definition of the state and its limits. Then we move
onto the results of ethnographic research in two cities in the global North (Chicago in
the US and Córdoba in Europe) in order to detail the struggles and conflicts in both
places resulting from the implementation of a concrete participatory process, surrounded
by a strong emancipatory rhetoric and poor results (participatory budgeting). Finally, we
conclude by discussing the possibilities offered by participation today as seen from this
perspective.
Re-framing participation
Critics of participation have called into question the enthusiasm for participation because
its advocates often fail to address questions of power, inequality, and politics (Cooke &
JOURNAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY 329
Kothari, 2001). More broadly, scholars have begun to point to participation, and partici-
patory prescriptions in particular, as part and parcel of neoliberal governmentality (Leal,
2007; Swyngedouw, 2005). In general terms, local governments had introduced partici-
pation as a way to improve the economic management of public administrations that
found themselves in financial difficulties rather than as a source of citizen empowerment
(Crenson & Ginsberg, 2004). As part of a new rationality of government that calls forward
an entrepreneurial citizen, participation indeed emphasizes some of the most important
characteristics of that citizen: Self-regulation, responsibility for individual problems, and
a non-conflictive partnership with the state (Li, 2005; Ong, 2006). In this formulation,
people are conceived as individuals who are to be active in their own government
(Rose, 1996). By stressing its compatibility with conventional power structures, partici-
pation may lose its transformative quality, neutralizing the emancipatory ideal of the
1960s and leading us, at best, towards a kind of ‘ordered change’ (Allegretti, 2014).
While these critiques are useful, we should not dismiss so easily the impact of the
expansion of participatory democracy (Rosanvallon, 2011). Setting aside for a moment
the question of whether participation makes for effective public policy, we should be atten-
tive to the possibility that the very act of participation can shift power relations in particu-
lar contexts. At least, we should not forget that any participatory project is built around
some ideals which are usually put in motion within complex settings. Participation
usually implies a collective space and also presumes certain equality between participants
(Barber, 1984; Fung & Wright, 2003; Pateman, 1970). As Ranciere suggests, this political
space marked by equality facilitates the ability of anyone to imagine themselves as a
partner in a shared world, ‘presupposing that one can play the same game as one’s adver-
sary’ (1998, p. 91). There is always something potentially subversive, and unpredictable, in
arrangements that imply this equality, even if projects are only driven by rhetoric, in a
world marked by inequalities, where citizens are only seen as clients and users of public
services.
While the critical literature covering this topic is insightful, it often relies on retrospec-
tive accounts of ‘a series of inevitable stages moving from the abstract to the concrete’
(Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007, p. 10). In fact, both critics and proponents of participation
tend to overlook how any participatory project requires allies, and how any such project
provokes tensions and conflicts. That is, whether scholars describe it a priori as a neolib-
eral project or celebrate it as a prima facie democratic advance, participation seems to
arrive on the scene as ready-made and then tested for its effects. We, instead, take our
cues from critical studies of science and technology, which insist that construction of
facts is always ‘a collective process’ in which heterogeneous actors come together
around issues and agree to work on them jointly (Latour, 1987). Participatory projects
are never the work of a single omnipotent and authoritative actor. These projects
usually involve a range of participants from different levels of government—‘stakeholders’
broadly defined—and a wide range of experts. With each additional participant, there is
always some redefinition of what participation will consist of. The very definition of par-
ticipation—the project’s goals, or who can be a legitimate participant—represents the
power of some agents to define those agendas. Participation also calls forth laborious
efforts made by the organizations of government to mobilize resources, allies, and
agents, with the aim of fixing its limits, of defining a proper field of operations, and of neu-
tralizing runaway participatory arguments.
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Much literature has treated the analysis of participation in terms of quality, usually
assessed by the procedures which promote equal distribution of opportunities among citi-
zens to have a voice or facilitate their impact on policies (Bryan, 2004; Font, Della Porta, &
Sintomer, 2014; Ganuza & Frances, 2012; Geissel & Joas, 2013; Talpin, 2012). We under-
stand, however, that participation implies conflicting elements that go beyond its assess-
ment merely from this point of view, which imagines an ideal process against which to
measure and evaluate a particular process. We understand that in addition to quality, par-
ticipation raises a debate on democratic borders: Who has access to all the information,
who can influence the decision-making process, how is it done? This implies taking par-
ticipation studies to a conflict scenario, where one has to understand the resistance to par-
ticipation, the conflicts arising around it and why they arise, the reasons of those involved,
as well as dynamics or practices that fall within the processes designed.
We thus propose to reframe this spread of participation globally—this ‘participation
age’—as profoundly paradoxical. To make sense of the potential of participatory democ-
racy today, we will consider how the spread of participatory democracy—rather than
being a route to the early demise of democracy, or a guaranteed step forward—is in
fact an invitation to debate its very boundaries. Our focus is on how participatory democ-
racy does—or does not—expand the boundaries of democracy and the kind of problems
and paradoxes involved in it. We believe that the failures and successes of participation are
related to profound questions about democracy and its limits in a complex society.
Given this ambiguity, and given our purpose of identifying how and when participation
can expand the boundaries of democracy, we analyse the arrival of participatory budgeting
(PB), one of the main participatory devices at disposal for government around the globe, in
the global North. PB sets in motion a relatively simple idea: That ‘ordinary citizens’ should
have a direct say in public budgets that impact them (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2016). Chicago
was the first city to launch PB in the US (2009) and Córdoba was one of the first European
cities to launch PB (2001). Each city played a crucial role in the adoption and replication of
the experience elsewhere. Chicago’s PB was the model for New York’s, started two years
later, and Vallejo, California’s, a year after that, and provided the template for the dozen or
so experiences in the US at the time of writing. PB has even received mention at the federal
government level in the US in President Obama’s Second Transparency Plan. And after
Córdoba’s success, PB spread throughout Spain and Europe to prominent cities like
Berlin, Cologne, Seville, Edinburgh, Rome, and, most recently, Paris and Madrid. Hun-
dreds of smaller towns throughout Europe also attempted their own PB processes.
Today, the governments of Poland and the UK drive participatory budgeting projects.
On both continents PB has transcended local boundaries and for many observers has
become a harbinger of new possibilities for democratizing current structures and bringing
government closer to citizens. In the case of the US, for example, the Penn Medal of
Democracy has described PB as ‘the most important democratic innovation of the 21st
Century’.1
In order to understand how the first local PB experiences set in motion the abundance
of current projects in the global North, we must pause to examine the conflicts that have
shaped the development of this participatory instrument. Underlying struggles for power
and authority—between and among participants and city officials—were negotiations over
profound questions about democracy, who represents certain communities, and who can
determine the legitimacy of citizen demands.
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The democratic turn: how to give power to ‘the people’?
Alderman Joe Moore’s decision to introduce participatory budgeting to the 49th ward in
Chicago in the summer of 2009 was novel. His constituency had not demanded more
opportunities to participate in local politics. His goal, however, as he described it at
public events, was to put power back into the hands of ‘the people’ who had given it to
him in the first place. This goal became complicated throughout the process, as the PB
‘recipients’ asserted different ideas about what it meant to give power to ‘the people’.
Moore had learned about participatory budgeting at the 2007 US Social Forum and
through his connections with Cities for Progress, a national network of progressive city
officials. He was excited by the idea of implementing a process that would be the first
of its kind in the US. Knowing his activist constituency, he also believed the community
would receive the project well. He contacted the Participatory Budget Project, a nascent
network of volunteer experts interested in implementing PB in North America, and the
group provided him with guidance based on experiences elsewhere.
Maria José Moruno launched Córdoba’s first participatory budgeting endeavour in
2001. Moruno was a schoolteacher who had gained popularity through her activism in
the city’s feminist movement. She was elected to the municipal government in 2000
after leftist parties widened their platform to include new activists. For her, as for
Moore in the US, PB ‘was a way to give real power to citizens’.2 Moruno learned about
PB directly from the architects of Porto Alegre’s PB. The Federation of Neighbourhood
Associations, in late 1999, invited the Porto Alegre practitioners to Córdoba. The head
of the Federation proposed participatory budgeting as part of a larger effort to encourage
citizen participation in the city. Additionally, PB would enable these movements to play a
definitive role in public decisions. In practice, however, Córdoba’s PB project turned out to
be more complicated than these activist groups originally anticipated. As in Chicago, there
were conflicting views about how to give power to the people. Moruno sent a government
colleague to the first World Social Forum in Porto Alegre in 2000 and began a dialogue
with a group of academics from Complutense University of Madrid, led by an expert in
participatory methodologies, Tomás Rodríguez Villasante (1995), with the aim of launch-
ing PB.
For Maria Jose Moruno and Joe Moore, participatory budgeting signified more than the
natural evolution of participatory traditions. For Moore, it meant something ‘very radical
in the US, as people will be able to decide directly how tax dollars will be spent in the
ward’.3 For Moruno, PB was different as ‘you bring participation to people’.4 They saw
this new tool as a way to reform the political system in a political context marked by dis-
affection. On the one hand, both Moruno and Moore identified a need to address what
they saw as the limited representative practices of civil society organizations. On the
other hand, they felt it was necessary to bring citizens closer to government. They envi-
sioned a new collaborative space in which everyone had the same voice to engage in gov-
ernment processes.
Moruno and Moore encountered several obstacles as they attempted to implement par-
ticipatory budgeting in their communities. Because current modes of participation had
failed to revitalize politics, Moore and Moruno had decided to propose a radical
change. They both continuously referenced the importance of ‘equal space’ in their
defence of PB, questioning the organization of civil society and the bureaucratic and
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elitist perspectives underlying the structure of political representation. Reflecting on her
experience years later, Moruno expressed, ‘I believe that participation was already reflect-
ing the habits of purely representative democracy. Citizens were mimicking the operation
of representative democracy. I think we should welcome fresh approaches and new modes
of behaviour.’5 These new modes of behaviour were the same modes that Moore wanted to
achieve in Chicago when he explained during one of the initial meetings with people in the
49th ward that the project aimed to transfer power to the people in the spirit of a more
‘democratic democracy’.
For Moruno and Moore, the residents’ political disaffection created the conditions for
these experiments. Because the projects were new, Moruno and Moore could narrate the
process as if it were happening in a lab. They could test different models and ideas. In this
context, Moore and Moruno imagined PB as a battle to conquer new spaces in advance.
Moruno remembered in an interview in Cordoba in 2009, ‘[I] used to say that PB was a
plant we were watering, and that many would want to cut down this plant, but as long
as we were able to protect its roots, we could succeed.’ Moore expressed something
similar in a conference in Brown University in 2011 about PB in Chicago: ‘I tried to do
things differently; I like to keep things fresh; we need to improve democracy and exper-
iment with new ways of engagement.’ While PB was part of a long-term vision to
enhance democracy, Moruno and Moore had to take more immediate steps. This short-
term political environment encouraged them to present the process as politically
neutral and widely accessible. Moruno used to emphasize the rhetoric of PB as a ‘space
of equals’, while Moore used to described PB as ‘widely popular’.
Expanding democratic boundaries
Politicians at all levels of government have come to promote and endorse ‘participation’—
broadly defined—and favour the expansion of participatory experiences. This widespread
support of participation has fostered the standardization of participatory practices around
the world (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2016). However, those who worked to bring PB to Chicago
and Córdoba were operating in a different context. In Cordoba and the 49th ward of
Chicago, Moruno and Moore faced political resistance to their participatory budgeting
experiments from the beginning. Their projects transformed political coordination from
an abstract concept intended to mitigate political apathy to a particular activity requiring
civil servants and politicians to change the way they functioned. They had to socialize this
new space within the public administration. As we will see, this new conception brought
about internal resistance to prevent the expansion of participatory spaces. To fully under-
stand the rhetoric of participation we should not leave out what PB meant at the begin-
ning, as well as the efforts made by its promoters to keep it going.
These early PB experiments sought to replace representation with collective delibera-
tion. Leaders of the PB efforts hoped to create spaces where everyone had an equal
right to speak. More than that, they aimed to generate a collective process of decision-
making, expressing a vision that displaced politicians and technicians from their
established roles. Rather than a process that aggregated organizations’ interests and
then conveyed them to political officials—privileging the role of urban social movements
or of politically prominent individuals in the community—here citizens could directly
submit proposals to their local governments. The emancipatory rhetoric that accompanied
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the political messages of Moruno (‘to give real power to citizens’) and Moore (‘to put
power back into the hands of the people’) envisioned a long-term scenario from the
start. As in a laboratory, the action then was guided by trial and error logic. This prudence
tried to offset the initial resistance to the participatory process, minimizing its effects. ‘The
important thing is to create that democratic culture’, Moruno used to say during those
years. The immediate result was to limit the ability of citizens to influence the participatory
process to small-scale infrastructure, something that has become a common element of PB
experiences everywhere. But at the beginning, Moore’s dream was to be able to manage
more budgets, including the City Hall operational budget.
Implementing an experiment in which participants have no significant power to
influence the administrative structure compounds some contradictions. By allowing
participants to make only small decisions, public administrations can give the
impression of empowerment while foreclosing other political possibilities. Opening
one avenue of political expression can close off others, like public protests and other
manifestations of political discontent. For example, within PB processes, citizens can
usually only discuss and decide upon what the government permits. From the point
of view of government officials, these are often insignificant issues, as demonstrated
by the purview of participatory budgeting projects in Córdoba and Chicago. While
this is a general criticism of many PB projects and democratic innovations (Lee
et al., 2015; Polletta, 2014), we think that it does not entirely void the emancipatory
rhetoric of participatory spaces.
Córdoba’s and Chicago’s results may be minor, but the conflicts preceding their
implementation uncover a tense process and hard-fought struggles for empowerment.
Throughout the process of establishing ‘political reform’—the term PB promoters in
Córdoba and Chicago used to justify the experiments’ implementation—participants
encountered obstacles at every turn, even if they had little influence on the adminis-
tration’s outcomes. Thus PB often introduces situations that are more complex than orig-
inally anticipated, as we will see in the conflict surrounding experts and citizens. PB was
not only about giving a voice to citizens, something that is usually accepted in a political
atmosphere marked by disaffection, but also about the impact these new spaces could have
within administration. It marks a cornerstone of democratic boundaries. In other words,
new participatory devices such as PB go through old styles to open the way for new habits
in government. The conflicts arising from their implementation highlight the fact that par-
ticipation is always related to profound democratic questions and how we shape them.
The rule of experts?
In Chicago, the ‘transportation committee’ within PB was the site of one of the most active
groups of participants. The committee, composed of about fifteen members, drew a mix of
activists demanding increased bikeways on the streets, recreational cyclists and walkers
who wanted more pathways along the lake, and individuals motivated by a general
concern for the community and improved transportation. The committee met twice a
month as a full committee and also broke into various subcommittees (such as a ‘sidewalks
committee’), some of which met separately. One of the issues the transportation commit-
tee addressed early on was the perceived lack of usable and safe bike lanes in the Ward.
Committee members repeatedly expressed concern about the need to find a way to
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‘separate bikes from cars on the street’. The committee searched for creative, innovative
solutions to the problem. They researched other cities’ models, and were surprised to
uncover a range of alternative biking infrastructure models already in use. Excited by
the possibilities, they developed a project proposal, based on a combination of features
from these designs and involving a wide stretch of bike lanes that would be separated
from the streets by an additional curb that would divide biking and car traffic. ‘Curb shift-
ing’, as the structure is widely known, is already used in several cities recognized for their
bike friendliness, such as Portland, Oregon (US), and Paris.
In every way, their particular style of local innovation was in line with current decen-
tralized governance philosophy: They wanted to develop an ambitious and sustainable
bike lane project, based on best practices but tailored to local needs. Yet, the project
still needed the city’s blessing in the form of a feasibility approval before it could be
placed on the ballot. In theory, this should have been a minor step in the process.
Once the participants in the transportation committee had developed their idea for the
project, they arranged a meeting with the City of Chicago Bicycle Program. The meeting
was held in the evening at Rogers Park, after weeks of preparation. They felt confident
about the project’s goal—segregated bike lanes—and also had collected detailed infor-
mation about cost and regulations from city planners. The representative from the city,
a planner in his mid-twenties from CDOT (City of Chicago Department of Transpor-
tation), arrived at the meeting with his standard presentation in hand. He began by
giving an overview of the CDOT Bicycle Program and followed with a PowerPoint of
the city’s bikeways programming. The latter involved a description of the typical bike
lane design, with which all of the representatives were more than familiar: Lanes separated
by painted lines on streets that met certain width requirements. To the participants, the
presentation was uninformative and elementary, if not downright insulting.
The transportation committee had also prepared their own presentation on their
project. They explained the curb-shifting design they wanted to propose, outlined how
and why they thought it could work, and gave a brief overview of the implementation
schemes in other cities. The CDOT planner, surprised by the presentation, responded
by dismissing their ideas as ‘creative but unfeasible’ (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2016). Curb-
divided bike lanes would have to be at least ten feet wide, he said, because city snowplows
have a ten-foot clearance. Lanes of that size were cost prohibitive, not to mention unsui-
table for most streets. For this reason, Chicago was limited to designated bike lanes and a
few other options. Curb-shifting lanes simply could not receive feasibility approval, he
said. The representatives were frustrated and disappointed.
Over the next weeks the committee continued to contest the merit of the city planner’s
assessment. Rather than accept and adapt to the logic of the planner, they argued that he
was making a technical issue out of something that was in fact political. The city require-
ments were, in the words of one committee member, ‘chosen policies, not naturally
imposed limitations’. The representatives also resented being shut out of the debate.
Even though they were not professional technocrats, engineers, or planners, they were citi-
zens. As residents of the city affected by its policies, they felt entitled to a legitimate voice
and influence over city planning. On another level, the representatives felt that the city
official’s claims to superior authority over policy decision-making were unjustified
because their ‘expert knowledge’ was shallow. The bikeways planner had asserted that
curb-shifted bike lanes were unfeasible, yet cities around the world had implemented
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them. The representatives saw a clear way around the snowplow issue and proposed it as
an alternative: To buy smaller plows and then build smaller bike lanes.
The city government did not relent from its judgement, however. Despite repeated
pleas by participants, CDOT did not deviate from the original position. The transportation
committee then became embroiled in its own controversy—should it accept the watered-
down version of bike lanes on the street, or should it not submit a bike lane proposal at all?
Was it worse to capitulate to bureaucratic mandate or to not have new bike lanes at all? For
some of the younger activists committed to a ‘post-carbon lifestyle’, capitulation was seen
as treason to the greater cause. For others who adopted a more ‘pragmatic’ stance, a
watered-down proposal still represented progress because it would lead to greater aware-
ness about biking and might lead to better bike lanes in the future. A difficult compromise
position eventually emerged: The restricted bike project would go on the ballot, under the
title ‘– PHASE I’, thus signalling future expectations. Some of the activists left the parti-
cipatory budgeting process at this point, but all agreed that the city’s explanation did
not reflect expertise, but rather bureaucratic impotence and stifled creativity.
The several months of debate and controversy over the project resulted in these partici-
pants questioning the politicization of technical criteria. They recognized that engineers
and city planners had a role to play in the development of sound infrastructure policy,
but came to feel that these experts had overstepped their role. They also felt the city
used ‘expertise’ to justify the insulation of policy decisions. The city had always based
decisions like these on internal technical expertise not subject to outside scrutiny. The
halls of the Chicago Department of Transportation and the Chicago Park District were
filled with city planners, engineers, and bureaucrats whose jobs were to determine the par-
ameters for infrastructure development. They defined what sorts of projects fit within
these parameters. The ward offices were simply supposed to choose from among the
pre-determined sets of options. In short, city officials believed there was a definite line
after which there was no room for politics or the citizen mandate. In their view, some
realms of decision-making belonged to experts, not citizens.
More intriguing than the bureaucratic logic of the city’s planners are the ways in which
participants in the process resisted what has been described elsewhere as the ‘rule of
experts’ or ‘expert closure’ (Latour, 1987). For the most part, participants came to see
‘feasibility’ as a mask for the political priorities of other existing governance bodies.
Thus, as the process unfolded, rather than acquiescing to a universal adaptation to the
logic of governmental expertise, the PB process constantly challenged the status quo.
Instead of moulding communities to align with the priorities of government institutions,
PB generated significant friction around the priorities themselves. If city agencies viewed
expertise as definitive, specific, and authoritative, participants considered expertise quali-
fied and general, and informative rather than prescriptive (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2016).
Engaging in city politics provoked several profound questions. For example, does
‘expertise’ or citizenship lend itself to more legitimate claims to speak for and on behalf
of others? If expertise prevails, then what constitutes an expert, and to what extent does
expertise trump politics? If citizenship matters more, what values does ‘citizenship’
demand of the citizen? Both city experts and citizen participants’ views on these questions
did not necessarily predate these conflicts, at least not in their fullest forms. Rather,
interacting within the contested process of PB defined, refined, and crystallized their
perspectives.
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Beyond the line
The Chicago story demonstrates the complex dynamics between citizens and the admin-
istrative machinery of local governments. PB in the 49th ward revealed an otherwise
hidden line of separation between the rule of experts and collective citizen knowledge.
PB opened up a new space of autonomy for citizens to empower themselves, often in
opposition to the local administration. The 49th ward’s struggle around expertise and
citizen voice is not specific to the US. Other contemporary democracies experience
similar frictions around the site of the demos. PB allows citizens, many of whom are accus-
tomed to their marginal role in public service, direct contact with their local government
officials. This contact, and its resulting tensions and debates, challenges the legitimacy of
the status quo. Rarely do observers notice the plethora of resources administrations
employ to maintain the line of separation between experts and citizens. Their goal is to
minimize PB’s ‘collateral damage’ of opening up new political spaces to citizens. In
Chicago and Córdoba, these conflicts represent the administrations’ fear of a different pol-
itical configuration.
Within government administrations, civil servants are often the first to recognize how
PB changes their daily work. More than encountering new participatory spaces, they
experience a transformation of the nature of their work. It is the technicians who must
explain why the administration rejected certain citizens’ proposals. And, of course, they
must respond to citizens’ concerns and allow them to feel as if they have some power
over the meeting’s agenda. Most technicians do not intentionally oppose this new scen-
ario. They are civil servants who are aware of the public administration’s hierarchy. There-
fore, political representatives’ choice to implement PB does not concern them directly.
They behave in the Weberian sense of ‘honest officials’. However, technicians can shape
the political agenda through their technical knowledge. Citizens do not have the same elec-
toral legitimacy as politicians, so technicians feel less obligated to follow their political
mandate. These dynamics turn PB’s implementation process into a discussion about
different types of knowledge. It positions the ‘vague, selfish and contingent’ citizen
against the ‘objective and accurate’ expert.
In Córdoba, the city offered a PB training course to technical staff early on in the
process. The training brought up many of these frictions. The course aimed to teach
the staff how to disseminate and socialize the process in such a way as to reduce internal
resistance in its implementation. City workers in positions relevant to PB (finance, infra-
structure, and participation) had priority, but the training was not limited to them—30
other city officials joined. The Director of the Education Department, with a career span-
ning more than thirty years in public service, conveyed that ‘[PB] beautifully opens spaces
to the public. [But] we cannot do everything they say’. She articulated the concern, shared
by other administrators, that citizens would operate in a ‘consumerist’ mentality. She
worried that ‘they are unable to think about the city; they make many self-interested pro-
posals and this could be a disaster’. Technical staff perceived the public’s lack of infor-
mation and ignorance as hindrances to legitimate participation. Including officials, such
as this director, in the PB process is thus always a complicated move. In Córdoba, for
example, the history of domestic construction illustrates the administration’s bitter
effort to continuously separate the spaces that the participatory process attempted to inter-
vene in.
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In February 2002, the General Director of the Presidency of the City of Córdoba, the
highest public administration authority, called a meeting (with relevant technicians
within the administration) to define the city management’s strategy in the participatory
budgeting experiment. After a year, the PB facilitators began to demand resources from
the administration because citizens demanded them. When participants inquired about
the record of decisions made during the previous year, municipal officers complained
to their superiors about these ‘new’ responsibilities. As the administration expanded
their requirements to address PB demands, critical voices within the administration
began to emerge. The process now involved the work of a growing number of municipal
employees in different areas of management.
The tension between citizens, who demanded a voice through the new process, and
technicians, who were suspicious about these new dynamics, necessitated an external
and authoritative figure to make final decisions. The city, the Director General told the
attendees, valued the PB project and had deemed it successful after its first year. Three
thousand people had taken part. The Director General also asked the group what role poli-
ticians could play in the participatory process. He wondered how significantly citizen par-
ticipation had pervaded the administrative machinery. The Director General of the
Presidency, rather than Moruno, who was the political representative for participatory
budgeting, defended a circumscribed role for participation:
The aim of participatory budgeting is to promote the budget proposals, and citizen partici-
pation is a secondary effect [or something derived from it]. In this sense, we must always
strive to achieve the ultimate goal: that participants submit proposals. Then, the politicians
do what they want. Politicians do not know how to make a budget. Up to now they have used
a technique, but they weren’t aware of doing so. This participatory budgeting is another tech-
nique. The budget is the end and participation the means, the instrument, not vice versa.
This statement reflects how government officials in Córdoba viewed PB as a threat to their
established order. In this context, the General Director drew from the logic of new public
management: Participation offers new inputs to a governance process. This view neutral-
izes PB as a source of democratic reform. It implies that citizens have needs that guide
their decisions and technicians are simply neutral intermediaries. Given the risk that
different spheres of power (political, technical, and citizen) overlap, the General Director
defines ‘participation [as] a secondary effect’. In this arrangement, PB serves as the mech-
anism of the administrative logic of input–output. The process allows the administration
to gather information about citizens’ needs in a new way. Thus, the General Director was
able to easily change the input-process style to fit PB’s model. So, if PB participants in
Cordoba constantly demanded politicians’ involvement in the process and civil servants’
assessment in popular assemblies, the municipal staff asserted that the participatory
process should be composed of neutral procedures for collecting citizens’ needs.
Do PB processes establish new relationships between administrative instruments and
citizens? The Director General’s statement offers some clues on how public adminis-
trations interpret participatory budgeting. Administrative assumptions include: (1) PB
is an experience outside of the dynamics of management, and is another way of under-
standing the inputs that contribute to any administrative process; (2) PB has more to
do with citizens’ needs than with collective regulation; (3) PB is not political, rather, it
is a technical process, so long as it provides new material for the administration to
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connect inputs and outputs; and (4) the emancipatory rhetoric of participatory budgeting
becomes part of technical rhetoric, focused on operating in the interest of individual citi-
zens’ needs.
From this point of view, the emancipatory dimension we usually associate with demo-
cratic innovations is compromised because citizen involvement is not tied to political
change. At least not in the short term, as expressed by the General Director:
Now you can perfectly maintain the formal structure (political parties) separate from the
informal structure (participatory budgeting). In the future [we] will inevitably articulate
them but for now they should function as parallel structures. If we speak of participatory bud-
geting as inconsistent with representative democracy, participatory budgeting is only an
instrument. With participatory budgeting we are not talking about deepening democracy;
that would be something else.
Governments in Córdoba and Chicago demonstrated an explicit desire to mark a line of
separation between the inside and the outside, between civil society, as an informal sche-
matic structure, and government, including political parties, as a formal structure. Public
administrations must continuously work to maintain this division. It is not easy to recon-
cile the emancipatory rhetoric of participatory budgeting propagated by its proponents (to
put power back into the hands of the people), with the neutral rhetoric of the public
administration. From this approach, the deliberative organization of new participatory
spaces generates much ambivalence. In addition to empowering citizens and giving
them a voice, these new spaces make it impossible to ignore political conflicts.
As we saw in the case of Chicago, these processes produce constant tensions, forcing
administrative staff to constantly monitor the line of separation. Participants insist on
the political dimension of their experience, persistently demanding that politicians and
technicians attend public assemblies. Yet the public administration instructs their employ-
ees to avoid this dimension. This dissension causes frustration among technical employees
and provokes suspicion among citizens. Most of the municipal staff responsible for facil-
itating the PB process in the neighbourhoods of Córdoba, for example, resisted its
implementation. They were aware that this new instrument bolstered citizens’ expec-
tations but did not significantly change technical or political discourse. As a way to regu-
late the rhetorical representation of PB among municipal employees, the General Director
in Cordoba explained: ‘technical staff works within the administration and assemblies do
not. Assemblies are made up of citizens; technical staff does not have anything to do there’.
Public administrators tried to justify these claims with obscure definitions about skill.
They described the difficult and complex functions of the administration. In a response
to a group of participants about city decision-making in 2002, the General Director of
the City of Córdoba explained,
The budget is made up by items, rather than projects, and then politicians decide what is
included. It may be that part of the infrastructure budget has no projects, but that money
is in another part of the government team, so perhaps the project that you demand is not
in the area of infrastructure and maybe they [those responsible for infrastructure] do not
know it. If you knew the inner workings of City Hall, you would see that sometimes it is
not possible to give all the information.
The struggle for voice, as we see, became the struggle for legitimacy to be heard as citizens
in a political, not technical, space.
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Participation, small things, and democratic boundaries
In both cities, a year of messy politics followed the genesis of participatory budgeting. The
line between expert knowledge and popular mandate can create tensions and divisions.
The participatory budgeting stories of Chicago’s 49th ward and the city of Córdoba
confirm the existence of this tension, but they also shed light on how it impacts the
process and its outcomes. Our point is not simply that the contestation exists—it most cer-
tainly does—but rather that it is productive. It is the space in which new political groups
and relationships emerge, evolve, and come into conflict; as such, its trajectory is crucially
determinative and shows us the paradox of this ‘participation age’.
Over the course of the long process of developing PB proposals, citizens in Chicago and
Córdoba stepped into the work of governance. They debated priorities, probed questions
of feasibility, and delved deep into seemingly simple issues of cost. In so doing, they acted
in spheres normally occupied by other representative bodies—the Alderman or Councillor
and their offices, the City of Chicago or Córdoba agencies, and others. Their work sig-
nalled that new modes of representation might not merely indicate new faces of power,
but could also introduce new forms and styles.
The process of determining the feasibility of projects and estimating their costs in
PB spurred intense disputes between citizens and Chicago municipal agencies. In
Córdoba the process of rank-ordering projects generated intense conflicts within the
administration. The latter were accustomed to deference on these issues. These engin-
eers, city planners, and technocrats believed that their experience working on municipal
projects accorded them a certain degree of authority. Examining the PB experiments in
Chicago and Córdoba offers us an overlapping view into this conflict over expertise and
citizen knowledge. This conflict underlies the scope of participatory projects and their
ability to give a sense of empowerment. In Córdoba, the officials who coordinated the
participatory process within the public administration desperately avoided the internal
spread of a new style of governance under the pressure of citizens for more adminis-
trative involvement in the process. They sought to neutralize participatory spaces and
their influence within the administration. The PB structure in Chicago, on the other
hand, endowed with a sense of political license, had little respect for insulated sites
of power. They questioned the validity of municipal agencies’ expertise, and also chal-
lenged the view that expert knowledge generally trumps politics to a greater extent
when the officials who coordinate the process attempt to get a balance between admin-
istration experts and citizens. The stories of both cities illustrate the struggles that took
place between representatives and city agencies over expertise- versus citizenship-based
claims to power.
A major organizing principle of democratic innovations is the centrality of partici-
pation. But if our gaze is limited to participation itself we lose sight of how it is con-
nected to governance. Attention to citizen participation in new democratic spaces must
be coupled with an examination of how administrations themselves structure the
avenues of participation. The participatory experiments implemented in both
Chicago and Córdoba were modest. Participants made decisions about small infra-
structure projects. Like in many other cases, democratic innovations took place at
the margins of government functions and were treated as informal adjuncts to the gov-
ernance process. Their installation in both places occurred without shifting
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administrative practices, but they nonetheless enabled citizens to engage in new sites of
participation. The simple act of opening new spaces for citizen participation and creat-
ing deliberative processes did transcend the decision-making processes on infrastruc-
ture, but again and again administrators circumscribed this transformation to
minimize its structural scope.
The local government in Córdoba avoided accountability and established a line between
the public administration and the participatory project. City officials gave several reasons
for this division. Sometimes they cited the complexity of the technical architecture; other
times they noted the inability to address demands due to legal reasons never made explicit.
Sometimes they referred to guiding principles (‘to work for the city as a whole’ or ‘political
priorities’) that structured the budget, displacing citizens’ priorities into a secondary space.
Sometimes they simply declared that ‘participatory budgeting is not the same as the leg-
islature’. From the city officials’ point of view, dealing with participatory budgeting
required an ongoing effort to maintain a precarious balance. They had to negotiate
between safeguarding the political representatives from changing their way of doing poli-
tics while trying to appease the citizens who believed that participatory budgeting meant
doing things differently.
In the 49th ward in Chicago, after the first year of PB, the relationship between the city
councillor’s office and the city agencies was somewhat formalized. Experts from city
agencies played a more immediate role in the process, vetting projects earlier. But they
also reasserted their technical authority. In no uncertain terms these experts notified
the ward office that their technical vetoes were final and not up for discussion. Despite
participants’ attempts during the first year to transcend the boundaries of the process
by re-defining some of the terms of engagement, the enduring version of the process
was one in which technical expertise subordinated citizen knowledge. And, notwithstand-
ing some early ideas of transcending the restrictions of menu money, or allocating greater
portions for infrastructure, or even seeking other pots of money, the process remained tied
to the small discretionary infrastructure budget.
Therefore, to understand the scope of participatory spaces we must look beyond parti-
cipatory procedures, and consider their relationship with the structures of local govern-
ments and public administrations. Concentrating on this relationship allows us to
analyse the conflicts that arise over new principles of political coordination. Moreover,
it speaks about the influence these spaces have in connecting or disconnecting citizens
to or from governance structures.
It is important to note, too, that political representatives like Moruno in Córdoba or
Moore in Chicago are not the only relevant actors. Though they speak of political
renewal and reform, they do so against a backdrop of government structures that are
resistant to the transformation. They confronted city officials who wanted to protect
their traditional practices and who could deploy disciplinary techniques aimed at neutra-
lizing the influence of new participatory spaces. Administrations’ resistance to change
leads to impotent participatory projects, even if their procedures are effective. But resulting
tensions between citizens and city officials provoke unprecedented battles over access to
political spaces. Participatory spaces certainly allow citizens to speak and, beyond
seeking agreements within particular projects, empower participants to challenge the defi-
ance of administrations.




2. Interview with Maria Jose Moruno in Cordoba, Spain, 27 April 2009.
3. Interview with Joe Moore in Providence at Brown University, US, 14 April 2011.
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5. Interview with Maria Jose Moruno in Cordoba, Spain, 27 April 2009.
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